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I: INTRODUCTION
In 2019 in Newark, New Jersey, a community school mourned the sudden loss of two
elementary-aged students to asthma attacks.1 This tragedy is unfortunately not surprising in a city
where the child asthma rate is three times the national average, with an estimated 25% of child
residents suffering from asthma and asthma-related illnesses.2 Newark’s asthma epidemic can be
attributed to a number of factors, including the city’s proximity to the country’s third largest port
and one of its busiest airports.3 Notably, many Newark residents are low-income people of color,
and air pollution studies overwhelmingly show that marginalized communities face higher
exposure to harmful pollutants.4 Experts estimate that most of the city’s residents are burdened by
air pollution and suffer the accompanying health and environmental effects. 5
On the opposite coast of America, California residents also feel the repercussions of
unrelenting air pollution and suffer chronic health effects. In 2017, Magali Sanchez Hall stood on
her street in Wilmington, California, a working-class, predominantly Latino neighborhood only a

Devna Bose, ‘It’s killing children and no one is talking about it’: Asthma is taking a steep toll on Newark’s
students and their schools, CHALKBEAT NEWARK (Dec. 17, 2019, 2:02 PM),
https://newark.chalkbeat.org/2019/12/17/21055583/it-s-killing-children-and-no-one-is-talking-about-it-asthma -istaking-a-steep-toll-on-newark-s-stude.
2 Id.
3
Id.
4 Disparities in the Impact of Air Pollution, AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION, https://www.lung.org/cleanair/outdoors/who-is-at-risk/disparities (last updated Apr. 20, 2020); Tara Failey, Poor Communities Exposed to
Elevated Air Pollution Levels, NATIONAL I NSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENTAL H EALTH SCIENCES (Apr. 2016),
https://www.niehs.nih.gov/research/programs/geh/geh_newsletter/2016/4/spotlight/poor_communities_exposed_to_
elevated_air_pollution_levels.cfm.
5 See Citizen Science in Newark, New Jersey, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Oct. 2015),
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sciencematters/citizen-science-newark-new-jersey.html; Michael Sol Warren, N.J.‘s
polluted cities are fighting to breathe. Meet their new environmental champion , NJ.COM (Aug. 13, 2020),
https://www.nj.com/news/2020/08/new-dep-boss-is-fighting-for-environmental-justice-in-njs-polluted-cities.html.
1
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short distance from Los Angeles’ congested freeways, bustling seaport, and oil refineries.6 As she
wiped her finger across the hood of a car, it stained with black soot.7 Sanchez Hall motioned to
the houses lining her street, recounting that nearly every resident has suffered from cancer. 8
Pollution continues to ravage the health and lives of residents in Wilmington, a neighborhood that
experienced increased emissions after California’s highly-anticipated cap-and-trade program went
into effect in 2013.9
California’s cap-and-trade system has been thoroughly critiqued and discussed within the
environmental community, but it is not the United States’ first prototype of a cap-and-trade
scheme. The U.S. Acid Rain Program, launched in 1990 under Title IV of the Clean Air Act
(CAA) Amendments, was the first American cap and trade system of its kind.10 Under this regime,
the federal government set an upper limit (“cap”) on the amount of sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) that could
be emitted from the electricity sector, but left it to private actors to individually determine how
they would meet the cap.11 The Program achieved incredible results reducing sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxide emissions, mitigating environmental damage, and improving human health
outcomes around the country.12
While the Acid Rain Program inspired many other modern cap-and-trade initiatives,
environmental justice (EJ) advocates have vigorously argued that market-based approaches to

6

Emily Guerin, Is California climate law worsening pollution in communities of color? , SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC RADIO (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.scpr.org/news/2017/02/02/68616/is-california -climate-law-worseningpollution-in-c/.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Acid Rain Program Results, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/acidrain/acid-rain-program-results (last updated Mar. 31, 2021).
11 Acid Rain Program, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/acidrain/acidrain-program (last updated Oct. 9, 2020); How Economics Solved Acid Rain, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND,
https://www.edf.org/approach/markets/acid-rain (last updated Sept. 2018).
12 Acid Rain Program Results, supra note 10.
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climate policy sacrifice local air quality protections in favor of market profit, leaving low-income
communities to endure the negative effects of pollution.13 Cap-and-trade has proven to be an
effective tool for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which are a major contributor to the
global climate crisis, and which are not immediately detrimental to human health.14 However,
existing cap-and-trade systems are not designed to target the troublesome “co-pollutants” that are
emitted from refineries and smokestacks alongside GHGs and are proven to directly harm public
health.15 Most cap-and-trade systems also create avenues for regulated companies to reduce their
global GHG outputs and thus comply with the program without cutting down emissions at their
home facilities.16 In California, particularly, some residents argue that their state’s system traded
away more aggressive, prescriptive local air regulations to appease the industry, forgoing measures
that they argue would have actually dealt with dirty air.17 Today, over 30 years after the passage
of the cap-and-trade provisions of the Clean Air Act and as domestic cap-and-trade systems
continue to increase in popularity, we must ask ourselves how pollution trading fits in with the
ideals of environmental justice.
Despite the promise of global benefits, some studies suggest that cap-and-trade may
negatively impact disadvantaged communities through unabated co-pollutant emissions, and many
EJ advocates argue that market-based, global approaches have been favored over measures to
address local air pollution.18 This Comment argues that in isolation, cap-and-trade systems are an

13

Daniel Farber, Emissions Trading and Social Justice, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BERKELEY PROGRAM IN LAW
AND ECONOMICS 20 (Sep. 20, 2011), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9z66c05g.
14 Nathanael Johnson, Cap and Trade-Offs, GRIST (Oct. 19, 2020), https://grist.org/climate/the-biggest-fight-over-capand-trade-isnt-about-what-you-think-it-is/; Guerin, supra note 6.
15 Joseph Lam, Spurring on Environmental Justice Through Cap and Trade, 2 C HI .-KENT J. ENVTL . ENERGY L. 1, 6
(2011); Johnson, supra note 14; Guerin, supra note 6.
16 Lisa Song, Cap and Trade Is Supposed to Solve Climate Change, but Oil and Gas Company Emissions Are Up ,
PROPUBLICA (Nov. 15, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/cap -and-trade-is-supposed-to-solveclimate-change-but-oil-and-gas-company-emissions-are-up; See infra Part II.D.
17 Johnson, supra note 14.
18 Johnson, supra note 14.
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unsuitable tool to use to improve air quality in marginalized communities. Cap-and-trade systems
that let companies stock up on allowances and utilize offsets lead to less substantial emissions
reductions at their facilities, which allows for hazardous co-pollutant emissions that harm the
communities surrounding them. This Comment proposes that the United States must enact stricter
air pollution regulations and address the co-pollutant challenges to effectively reduce emissions
while improving socioeconomic outcomes for environmental justice communities.
Part II of this comment sets out the mechanics of cap-and-trade, illustrates the dangers of
co-pollutants, and describes the practices of allowance banking and offsetting. Part III explores
the history of the environmental justice movement and examines the community’s relationship
with cap-and-trade systems. Part IV proposes a regulatory solution, including imposing stricter
banking and offsetting rules, investing cap-and-trade auction proceeds in EJ communities, and
promoting local air quality solutions through the Clean Air Act and state-level legislation.
II: CAP-AND-TRADE BACKGROUND
A. The Mechanisms Behind Cap-and-Trade
Emissions trading systems employ both market-based mechanisms and governmental
regulations, ensuring that companies can meet legal emissions limits while individually
determining their own compliance strategy.19 A cap-and-trade program allows the government to
establish a cap on emissions of a pollutant and then, consistent with the amount of the cap,
determine how many allowances are available to give to companies that emit the targeted

19

What is Emissions Trading?, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/emissions-trading-resources/what-emissions-trading (last updated Dec. 17, 2019).
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pollutant.20 Emissions must not exceed the government’s set cap, which in theory should become
more restrictive every year to pressure polluters to keep reducing emissions. 21
The participating government is usually responsible for setting and enforcing the cap,
determining penalties for non-compliance, and setting up the trading platform.22 The government
may distribute some permits for free and sell others at auctions, where the generated funds might
be dedicated to climate initiatives, like electric transportation or clean energy jobs, or earmarked
for different communities throughout the region.23 Allowances are sometimes given away for free
to build broad political support or to reduce adverse competition in the market. 24 Alternatively,
the government may choose to distribute most of their allowances through a permit auction.25
Once permits are distributed, private companies dictate how they will use their allocated permits.26
The permit market is where the “trade” aspect of the scheme takes shape, as companies work with
each other to buy or sell excess permits. 27 GHGs mix in the atmosphere, so trading and reallocating
emissions allowances does not affect overall emissions-reduction efforts, as long as some firm
somewhere in the program pulls their weight to reduce total emissions.28 This flexible trading
market allows entities to cost-effectively achieve emissions reductions without adhering to stricter
prescriptive standards, which is in large part what makes cap-and-trade attractive across the
industry.29

20

Id.
Song, supra note 16.
22 Sarah Light, The New Insider Trading: Environmental Markets within the Firm, 34 STAN. ENVTL . L.J. 3, 21 (2015).
23 See RGGI Strategic Funding Plan, Years 2020 through 2022 , NEW JERSEY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
7, https://nj.gov/rggi/docs/rggi-strategic-funding-plan.pdf.
24 Richard Schmalensee & Robert Stavins, Learning from Thirty Years of Cap and Trade, R ESOURCES M AGAZINE
(May 16, 2019), https://www.resourcesmag.org/archives/learning-thirty-years-cap-trade/.
25 Investments of Proceeds, THE R EGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS I NITIATIVE,
https://www.rggi.org/investments/proceeds-investments.
26 Song, supra note 16.
27 Song, supra note 16.
28 Dallas Burtraw, et. al, Managing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in California , THE C ALIFORNIA C LIMATE CHANGE
CENTER, UC BERKELEY 5-7, https://sallan.org/pdf-docs/Berkeley_Cap_and_Trade_Lessons.pdf.
29 Id.
21
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Various cap-and-trade systems have been adopted around the world, and many economists
and environmentalists praise the scheme’s flexible capability to cost-effectively reach aggregate
emissions-reduction targets.30 The European Union maintains a robust carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) capand-trade system and China is projected to implement the world’s largest CO 2 emissions trading
system in the 2020s.31 The Canadian province of Quebec launched a cap-and-trade program in
2013 that targets GHG emissions in its industrial and electricity sectors, and Ontario launched a
similar program in 2017.32 In the U.S., following the lead of the Acid Rain Program’s success,
multiple states have either adopted cap-and-trade systems or joined regional programs.33
Washington state legislators are debating whether to adopt a statewide cap-and-trade system.34
California’s signature cap-and-trade program, launched in 2013, is one of the world’s largest
emissions trading systems.35 California’s program is designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
by setting an extensive statewide emissions limit and “employing market mechanisms to cost effectively achieve [the State’s] emission-reduction goals.”36 On the east coast, the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a cooperative effort between ten states to cap and reduce CO2

30

Id. at 5–3; Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 24.
Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 24.
32 Anthony D’Agostino & Sarah Thompson, Cap-and-Trade in Canada: An Overview, RBC C APITAL M ARKETS (June
2017),
http://www.rbcroyalbank.com/commercial/campaign/supplychain/_assets-custom/pdfs/cap-and-tradeoverview.pdf.
33 Lam, supra note 15, at 3.
34 Tim Gruver, Washington state lawmakers want cleaner skies, Critics say cap and trade not the answer, THE C ENTER
SQUARE (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.thecentersquare.com/washington/washington-state-lawmakers-want-cleanerskies-critics-say-cap-and-trade-not-the-answer/article_4e59bf66-5a90-11eb-a729-d73d98e27ab9.html.
35 California Cap and Trade, C ENTER FOR C LIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
https://www.c2es.org/content/california -cap-and-trade/.
36 Cap-and-Trade Regulation Instructional Guidance, C ALIFORNIA AIR R ESOURCES B OARD 1 (Sept. 2012),
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/classic//cc/capandtrade/guidance/chapter1.pdf.
31
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emissions from the electricity sector.37 New Jersey, home to Newark, formally rejoined the RGGI
in 2020.38
In American cap-and-trade systems, the cap may be set by the federal government, as is
demonstrated by the Acid Rain Program.39 The cap may also be determined by the states, as is the
case for participating RGGI states (each state’s CO 2 Budget Trading Program sets a cap in
accordance with RGGI model rules) and in California’s system (where the California Air
Resources Board [CARB] sets a cap).40 The cap may be set on emissions from a specific industry,
and many existing systems commonly target carbon dioxide.41 This comment focuses on cap-andtrade schemes designed to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, primarily using California and RGGI
as case studies, and will propose a regulatory solution for American states to deal with the
associated co-pollutants.
In theory, cap-and-trade boils down to a simple idea: if a company emits pollution, that
company pays for it up front, and that payment is broadly dedicated to government programs and
climate protection initiatives.42

However, environmentalists and EJ advocates have voiced

concerns that cap-and-trade mechanics create “loopholes” where regulated entities can utilize

37

RGGI, Inc., THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS I NITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/rggi-inc/contact.
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in New Jersey, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
https://www.nj.gov/dep/aqes/rggi.html (last updated Mar. 18, 2021); New Jersey Participation, THE REGIONAL
GREENHOUSE GAS I NITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/program-overview-and-design/design-archive/nj-participation
(last visited Apr. 14, 2021). New Jersey was originally one of RGGI’s founding member states in 2005, and in 2008,
the Global Warming Solutions Fund Act officially authorized the state to participate in a cap -and-trade initiative like
RGGI. In 2011, former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie ended the state’s participation with RGGI, although for
compliance purposes and market stability, the state’s CO2 allowances were still recognized. In 2019, Governor Phil
Murphy announced that New Jersey would fully rejoin the RGGI, and the state resumed participation on January 1,
2020.
39 Acid Rain Program, supra note 11; Farber, supra note 13, at 8.
40 Elements of RGGI, THE R EGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS I NITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/program-overview-anddesign/elements; California Cap and Trade, supra note 35.
41 How Cap and Trade Works, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, https://www.edf.org/climate/how-cap-and-tradeworks. Notably, cap-and-trade mechanics have been used to regulate SOX and NOX emissions. See REgional CLean
Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM),
SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY M ANAGEMENT DISTRICT,
http://www.aqmd.gov/home/programs/business/about-reclaim (Regional Clean Air Incentives Market [RECLAIM])
and Acid Rain Program, supra note 11 (Acid Rain Program).
42 Song, supra note 16.
38
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banking and offsets to comply with the cap and lower their overall GHG emissions while
continuing to pollute at their facilities.43 The accompanying co-pollutant emissions from these
facilities can harm the communities surrounding them, which are overwhelmingly low-income
communities of color.44

B. Co-Pollutants
Atmospheric GHGs are not directly detrimental to human health, but GHG emissions from
fossil fuel combustion are typically released along with dangerous co-pollutants that jeopardize
public health outcomes.45 While regulated entities in cap-and-trade systems can achieve an overall
atmospheric reduction of GHGs, a cap-and-trade system might allow localized impacts of copollutants to continue unabated from covered facilities.46

Without additional regulations to

manage co-pollutants, cap-and-trade systems targeting GHGs can inadvertently lead to
exacerbated “hot spots” of dirty air in areas where harmful pollution is already a threat.47
Common co-pollutants include particulate matter (PM2.5 ), nitrogen oxides (NO X), sulfur
oxides (SO X), and volatile organic compounds (VOCs), which are linked to cardiovascular and

43

Song, supra note 16; see also Laura Beans, Carbon Offsets Could Create Loophole for Industry to Pollute as Usual,
ECOWATCH (Jul. 5, 2013, 4:03 PM), https://www.ecowatch.com/carbon-offsets-could-create-loophole-for-industryto-pollute-as-usual-1881773267.html. In RGGI’s cap-and-trade system, the only “regulated entities” are electric
power plants that generate 25 megawatts or more. In California, the cap -and-trade rules apply to electric power plants,
industrial plants, and fuel distributors that emit 25,000 tons of carbon dioxide per year or more. See Jonathan Ramseur,
Cong. Research Serv., R41836, The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Background, Impacts, and Selected Issues
(2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41836.pdf; California Cap and Trade, supra note 35.
44 Cushing, Lara et al. Carbon trading, co-pollutants, and environmental equity: Evidence from California’s cap -andtrade program (2011–2015), PLOS M EDICINE 1–2 (Jul. 10, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002604.
45 Id. at 3.
46 Id. at 3.
47 Alice Kaswan, CPR Perspective: Environmental Justice and Climate Change: Incorporating Environmental Justice
into Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Programs, THE CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM (July 2009),
http://progressivereform.org/our-work/energy-environment/perspejandcc/.
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respiratory diseases and higher incidences of mortality.48 The exact relationship between GHG
and co-pollutant emissions is complex and highly fact-sensitive, and the risks and benefits of
reducing co-pollutants may significantly vary across location and time. 49 However, there is some
evidence that facilities regulated under cap-and-trade produce a positive correlation between
emissions of GHGs and emissions of hazardous co-pollutants.50 For example, one study in
California found that certain co-pollutant emissions increased dramatically with GHG emissions,
such as PM2.5 in public service facilities, NO X in metal manufacturing facilities, SO X in refineries,
and VOCs in co-generation facilities.51
In California, regulated entities52 are overwhelmingly located in disadvantaged
communities, where residents are disproportionately people of color, people with lower rates of
educational attainment, and people with lower financial means.53 If a facility experiences an
increase in GHG emissions and thus, an increase in emissions of some accompanying co-pollutant,
the disadvantaged communities surrounding that facility could bear an unequal burden of
exposure.54 Environmental justice advocates argue that because GHG reductions are treated
equally regardless of where they occur, there is less of a focus on the neighborhoods that are home
to the polluting companies and are likely to feel the detrimental effects.55 Under cap-and-trade,
companies could purchase offsets to fulfill their GHG reductions globally without affecting their

Robert Sanders, California’s Cap-and-Trade Air Quality Benefits Go Mostly Out of State, BERKELEY NEWS (Jul.
10, 2018), https://news.berkeley.edu/2018/07/10/californias-cap-and-trade-air-quality-benefits-go-mostly-out-ofstate/; Cushing, supra note 44 at 3.
49 Todd Schatzki & Robert Stavins, Addressing Environmental Justice Concerns in the Design of California’s
Climate Policy, ANALYSIS GROUP 6 (Oct. 2009),
https://www.analysisgroup.com/globalassets/content/insights/publishing/environmental_justice.pdf.
50 Cushing, supra note 44 at 12–13.
51 Cushing, supra note 44 at 12–13.
52 See Ramseur, supra note 43 (discussing how California and RGGI respectively define “regulated entities.”)
53 Cushing, supra note 44 at 9–10.
54 Cushing, supra note 44 at 12–13.
55 Cushing, supra note 44 at 4.
48
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facilities’ emissions and thus, the accompanying co-pollutants. Likewise, a company with excess
allowances could hypothetically sell permits to a facility in a disadvantaged community, thus
allowing for more dirty emissions in already polluted areas.56
The immediate and long-term health effects of co-pollutants can be devastating.57
Exposure to unhealthy air pollutants has been associated with a variety of serious health effects,
such as heart failure, strokes, and reduced life expectancy.58 Specifically, exposure to SO 2 and
NO2 has been linked to reduced lung function, asthma, bronchitis, and increased risk of
hospitalization.59 PM2.5 exposure is especially dangerous because the fine particulate matter can
embed itself deep into humans’ bloodstream and airways, causing asthma, bronchitis, strokes,
heart attacks, and premature death in people with heart issues, lung disease, or cancer.60 Despite
the complexity of GHG and co-pollutant emissions, environmental justice advocates continue to
raise concerns about the possibility of increasingly damaging health effects in disproportionately
affected communities if co-pollutant emissions are not strictly regulated. Moreover, practices like
banking and offsets create avenues allowing for more localized facility pollution and thus,
unabated co-pollutants.

See Song, supra note 16. RGGI’s model rule provides that eligible offset projects may be located in certain states
or in any “United States jurisdiction in which a cooperating regulatory agency” understands the “certain obligations
relative to CO2 emissions offsets projects.” See 2017 Model Rule (Revised), THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
I NITIATIVE 101-02 (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.rggi.org/sites/default/files/Uploads/Design -Archive/Mod elRule/2017-Program-Review-Update/2017_Model_Rule_revised.pdf. In California, at least 50% of offset projects
must directly benefit California, but many occur globally. See California Cap and Trade, supra note 35.
57 Laurie Mazur, Cap-and-trade? Not so great if you are black or brown , GRIST (Sept. 16, 2016),
https://grist.org/justice/cap-and-trade-not-so-great-if-you-are-black-or-brown/.
58 Particle Pollution and Your Patient’s Health , UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/particle-pollution-and-your-patients-health/course-outlinekey-points (last updated Oct. 2, 2020).
59 Nitrogen Dioxide, AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION, https://www.lung.org/clean-air/outdoors/what-makes-airunhealthy/nitrogen-dioxide (last updated Feb. 12, 2020); Sulfur Dioxide, AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION,
https://www.lung.org/clean-air/outdoors/what-makes-air-unhealthy/sulfur-dioxide (last updated Feb. 12, 2020).
60 Particulate Pollution, AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION, https://www.lung.org/clean-air/outdoors/what-makes-airunhealthy/particle-pollution; Health impacts of air pollution, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND,
https://www.edf.org/health/health-impacts-air-pollution.
56
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C. Banking
Through either an auction or government distribution, or both, a regulated entity in a capand-trade program obtains a number of allowances that it can use to meet its emissions cap. In
certain systems, if some allowances are not needed, the entity can stock up their existing
allowances and “bank” them for future use.61 Banking allows regulated entities to achieve
“maximum gains” from allowance trading and also protects the general market from sudden price
spikes and crashes.62 However, without stringent limits, companies could stock up on permits and
use them in later years when the state’s emissions cap becomes more restrictive. 63
In California’s cap-and-trade system, an oversupply of allowances has significantly
blunted the effectiveness of emissions-reduction goals, so much so that “industry could potentially
cover most or all of its obligations out through 2030 using only stored -up allowances.”64 Because
carbon dioxide emissions turned out to be lower than was predicted in the California program’s
early years, more allowances were initially issued to polluting companies than were necessary to
meet the predetermined caps.65 In California, entities can bank permits indefinitely, so companies
could theoretically have a massive supply of permits obtained at an earlier, cheaper price to use
against future emissions obligations, when the permit cost is higher.66 One 2019 study found that
over 226 million excess allowances were being held by private California entities from 2013–
2018, far exceeding CARB’s prediction of 150 million excess allowances circulating by 2020.67

61

How Cap and Trade Works, supra note 41.
Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 24.
63 Song, supra note 16.
64 David Roberts, California’s cap-and-trade system may be too weak to do its job, VOX (Dec. 13, 2018, 12:43 PM),
https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/12/12/18090844/california -climate-cap-and-trade-jerry-brown.
65 Id.
66 Id.; see also California Cap and Trade, supra note 35 (noting that “regulated entities are subject to holding limits,
restricting the maximum number of allowances that an entity may bank at any time,” but that once held, these
allowances never expire.)
67 Jonah Kurman Faber, The (other) problem with offsets in California, C LIMATE XC HANGE (Oct. 18, 2019),
https://climate-xchange.org/2019/10/18/the-other-problem-with-offsets-in-california.
62
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As a result, companies could still comply with the program using banked allowances but not
actually have to buy new allowances at market rate to meet the cap.68
However, the European Union Emissions Trading System and the RGGI states have
demonstrated that it is possible to combat the oversupply conundrum. 69 Namely, RGGI maintains
a “rule-based ratchet” that makes emissions caps stricter once banked allowances reach a certain
level.70 Under this ratchet, as of 2020, the RGGI states have made two interim adjustments to their
overall caps to account for banked allowances, amounting to 139.5 million CO 2 allowances.71 It
is estimated that if CARB implemented a rule-based ratchet, permit prices would increase, thus
making it more difficult for investors to over-purchase cheap allowances.72 While banking is
important to protect economic considerations, indefinite banking without restrictions could lead to
a less effective cap, as is currently taking shape in California. An optimal system would implement
increasingly strict caps and restrict banked allowances as stringently as possible, while continuing
to account for economic stability.

D. Offsets
Allowance banking has been criticized for allowing polluting entities to avoid making
meaningful emissions reductions, and there is similar debate surrounding whether offsets in capand-trade programs effectively address localized air pollution. Regulated entities in cap-and-trade
programs can procure “offsets” that allow them to make up for the pollution they produce by
reducing emissions somewhere else, hypothetically cancelling out the effect of their own

68

Roberts, supra note 64.
Roberts, supra note 64.
70 Roberts, supra note 64.
71 Elements of RGGI, supra note 40.
72 Roberts, supra note 64.
69
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emissions.73 For example, a polluting company, such as a coal-fired power plant, may choose to
purchase offset credits from a timber company, which in exchange agrees not to cut down a certain
amount of trees.74 Offset projects exist in areas such as forestry, mine methane capture, and
livestock maintenance, to name a few. 75 Policymakers consider offsets to be a vital avenue for
investing in unique climate solutions and providing regulated entities with flexible options to meet
compliance obligations.76 However, the EJ movement criticizes offsets because as companies buy
into offsite carbon sequestration projects, they can avoid making emissions cuts at their home
facilities, allowing co-pollutant emissions to continue unabated and leaving nearby residents to
deal with the resulting unhealthy air.77
In the U.S., cap-and-trade programs have detailed specific compliance qualifications and
have set certain limits on the availability of offsets. In California, a capped entity may use offsets
to satisfy at most only 8% of their compliance obligations. 78 The proposed offset project must be
approved by a CARB-accredited verification body.79 The number of offsets allowed to satisfy
compliance obligations is set to become more restrictive. Offsets will be allowed for 4% of an
entity’s total compliance obligations between 2021 and 2025 and 6% between 2026 and 2030.80
Further, as of 2021, at least 50% of the offsets utilized to satisfy compliance obligations “must
come from projects that directly benefit California.” 81

73

Cap and Trade FAQs, NICHOLAS I NSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY SOLUTIONS, DUKE UNIVERSITY,
https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/focal-areas/cap-and-trade/cap-and-trade-faqs.
74 Kaswan, supra note 47.
75
Compliance Offset Protocols, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/ourwork/programs/compliance-offset-program/compliance-offset-protocols.
76 Faber, supra note 67.
77 Environmental Justice Issues in California’s Cap and Trade System, C ALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
ALLIANCE , https://caleja.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/EJissuesinCAcapandtrade.pdf.
78 The Role of Offsets in California’s Cap-and-Trade Regulation Frequently Asked Questions, ENVIRONMENTAL
DEFENSE FUND 2 (Apr. 2012), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/OffsetsPercentagesFAQFinal%20041612.pdf.
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Under RGGI’s scheme, to propose an offset project, the project sponsor is required to
submit a Consistency Application detailing its compliance with state regulatory requirements. 82
Once approved, the project sponsor must consistently submit “monitoring and verification reports
demonstrating the achievements of CO 2 e emissions reductions or carbon sequestration.”83 These
requirements must be met before the state can award any CO 2 offset allowances.84 RGGI’s offset
requirements are designed to ensure that the project’s CO 2 emissions reductions are “real,
additional, verifiable, enforceable, and permanent.” 85 Additionally, RGGI requires offset projects
to be located within an RGGI state that provides for CO2 offset allowances.86 The use of CO2
offset allowances is restricted to 3.3% of a facility’s CO2 compliance obligation for each period.87
Seven of the ten participating states award CO2 offset allowances.88
Despite the specifications and limitations contemplated in RGGI’s and California’s
schemes, many argue that offsets ultimately hinder local air quality benefits. For instance, while
an offset transaction between a power plant and timber company limiting tree harvesting may
result in globally reduced CO2 emissions and technically satisfy the plant’s compliance
obligations, the targeted entity could still continue to pollute locally, potentially releasing harmful
co-pollutants into the atmosphere.89 Many argue that it is morally unjust for polluters to buy into
faraway decarbonizing projects instead of investing in the communities where their facilities are
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located and where co-pollutants could most directly impact residents.90 EJ advocates recognize
that because cap-and-trade programs are solely focused on reducing global GHG emissions, the
same tool cannot be used to account for localized pollutants, and without ad ditional regulation,
overburdened communities will continue to suffer.
III: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Environmental justice is steeped in the principles of equity and inclusion and strives to
involve all people in environmental decision making.91 Advocates of the movement posit that the
ability to breathe fresh air, drink clean water, and live on safe land are fundamental human rights.92
Traditionally, environmental justice communities have been overburdened by industrial pollution
and often bear disproportionate health impacts.93 EJ communities have raised concerns about capand-trade programs, which are heavily dependent on market forces and overall emissions
reductions rather than localized, distributive environmental impacts, values that are more in line
with the movement’s principles.

A. Movement Background
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The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines environmental justice as “the
fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin,
or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental
laws,

regulations,

and policies.”94

One of the major

catalysts of the modern

environmental justice movement occurred during the Civil Rights Movement.95 In 1968, black
public works employees in Memphis, Tennessee mobilized a strike against abusive sanitation
practices and garnered national attention.96 Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and many other
national civil rights leaders came to the aid of the striking workers, ultimately culminating in a
deal that brought safer regulations and a stronger union. 97 In 1982, African Americans organized
a national sit-in demonstration protesting a toxic landfill in Warren County, North Carolina.98
Although the protest did not halt construction and over 500 activists were arrested, this event is
widely understood to be the spark that ignited the environmental justice movement.99
In the wake of the sit-in, the United States General Accounting Office conducted a study
using 1980 census data.100 The Office concluded that three out of four hazardous waste landfills
studied were located in predominantly low-income African American neighborhoods. 101 In 1987,
the United Church of Christ (UCC) Commission for Racial Justice published a groundbreaking
study, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States.102 The report found that toxic waste sites were
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statistically more likely to be located in communities with large minority populations.103
Hazardous waste areas were disproportionately concentrated in Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Native
American communities.104

This pioneering study was the first of its kind to examine the

intersection between race, class, and the environment on a national scale. 105
In the following years, a number of community environmental action groups were founded,
and as the grassroots movement gained substantial traction, the government took notice.106 In
1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration created the Office of Environmental Equity (now
known as the Office of Environmental Justice).107 In 1994, President Clinton signed an executive
order requiring federal agencies to incorporate environmental justice concerns into their
initiatives.108 Each federal agency would need to address the “disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority
populations and low-income populations in the United States.”109
Over the next 25 years, the EPA, state legislatures, and environmental groups have
reflected the needs of environmental justice communities in their work and policies. 110 What
started out as a small, radical coalition in the 1960s is now largely recognized as a national
movement. However, despite the movement’s decades of hard work and progress, the racial
injustices in polluted regions are deeply entrenched and low-income communities continue to
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experience significant toxic air quality levels and high incidences of disease.111 A 2017 study
found that African Americans are 75% more likely to experience toxic pollution in their
neighborhoods than other American citizens.112 A 2020 study of 3,000 American counties found
that a person living in a county with significant levels of fine particulate matter pollution is 11%
more likely to die from COVID-19 than someone who lives in a community with even 1 unit less
of such pollution.113
The movement emphasizes that a more socially, racially, and economically equitable world
is not achievable without a keen eye to environmental justice. Despite the setbacks, environmental
justice organizations have established themselves as powerful forces in communities across the
world and continue to be key advocates in the fight for a healthier environment.114

B. Environmental Justice Communities’ History with Cap-and-Trade Programs
Climate change has proven to be devastating for marginalized communities, and as climate
impacts worsen, the inequality gap will only be exacerbated for socioeconomically disadvantaged
people.115 Vulnerable communities tend to have less resources and capacity to deal with climate
catastrophes and are more likely to experience negative impacts on their livelihoods.116 Cap-andtrade is designed to combat climate change by reducing GHG emissions, but EJ advocates argue
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that utilizing market-based solutions by themselves gives industry an easy way to maximize their
profits and meet CO 2 reduction targets without addressing the localized impacts of pollution.117
As the United States confronts its deep-rooted legacy of racial injustice and faces the perils of
climate change, questions about the fairness of cap-and-trade are of paramount importance.118
While many cap-and-trade systems have taken steps to integrate environmental justice
concerns, tensions between the EJ community and cap-and-trade proponents are still prevalent.
California has been a leader in including the environmental justice movement in its policymaking,
but many of the movement’s supporters feel that the government is not doing enough as pollution
continues to ravage their communities.119 Still, environmental justice was at the forefront of the
state’s first major climate law in 2006, known as AB-32.120 The bill created an Environmental
Justice Advisory Committee (EJAC)121 and required CARB to make sure “that the activities
undertaken to comply with [its] regulations do not disproportionately impact low-income
communities.”122 The original 2006 bill left decisions about emissions reduction mechanisms up
to CARB and did not include cap-and-trade, largely due to many activists’ concerns about the lack
of public participation in cap-and trade schemes and the ability for facilities in disadvantaged
communities to find workarounds to actually reducing emissions.123

However, the state

government and the oil and gas industries continued to support cap-and-trade, and despite EJ
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opposition, the December 2008 scoping plan of the bill included an extensive cap-and-trade
program to target 85% of the state’s emissions.124
Evidence from the first few years of the cap-and-trade program may prove that some of the
EJ activists’ fears came true. A 2018 study found that in the first few years after California’s capand-trade program was implemented, more than half of the targeted facilities reported increased
in-state GHG emissions and thus, increased co-pollutant concentrations.125 While California
boasted a total reduction in GHG emissions, the result could be attributed more to reduced
purchasing of carbon-intensive electricity and offsets, rather than local facility emission
reductions.126

Importantly, the neighborhoods that suffered the effects of these increased

emissions were usually near the regulated facilities and chiefly composed of people of color and
working class, non-English speaking residents.127 Despite the evidence that air quality had
worsened in California, the study’s authors admit that there could have been factors at play besides
cap-and trade, such as economic recovery after the 2008 recession. 128

Regardless, many

environmental justice supporters argue that direct regulations would have simply resulted in more
tangible air quality improvement, but that such regulations were traded away in favor for a weaker
cap-and-trade program.129 While it is difficult to discern the exact pollution effects of cap-andtrade, the regime’s effect on EJ communities continues to be hotly debated.
Many states recognize that environmental justice communities are statistically more likely
to be exposed to harmful air pollution and suffer the effects of climate change, and accordingly, a
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number of cap-and-trade programs require that auction revenue be invested directly in
environmental justice initiatives.130 California requires that 35% of allowance auction proceeds
be invested in projects that directly benefit disadvantaged communities, and since 2014, the state
has delegated closer to 60% of proceeds to disadvantaged areas, or roughly $3 billion.131 However,
the success of the auctions can be unpredictable, as evidenced by one California auction in 2020
that produced just $25 million in revenue, compared to the $600 million to $850 million usually
raised at similar auctions.132

A more advantageous system would consistently dedicate

government resources to EJ communities, without linking the funding stream solely to auction
revenue.

IV: THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
Most cap-and-trade systems in their current form show considerable promise, but
mechanisms like banking and offsetting may undermine their efficacy. Additionally, energy
experts recognize that cap-and-trade alone is not a one-size-fits-all solution, and that more policy
mechanisms are needed to fully transition to a clean energy economy, address harmful copollutants, and harmonize climate policy with EJ communities and values.133
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would (1) reform banking, offsetting, and investment practices, while still preserving some of the
flexibility and autonomy of cap-and-trade and (2) stand as one component of a multifaceted climate
policy that integrates environmental justice concerns in State Implementation Plans (SIPs) and
designates resources toward local air quality monitoring and regulation.

A. Fixing Existing Cap-and-Trade Systems
While cap-and-trade is focused on fighting the greater goal of global climate change,
existing systems, in isolation, leave many people to suffer inequitable effects. An ideal system
would ensure that companies make more localized emissions cuts by restricting banking and offset
use and dedicating auction revenue to EJ initiatives, thus ensuring that more benefits accrue to
disadvantaged communities.

i.

Reforming Banking and Offsetting
Without specific limitations on banking allowances and offsetting practices, cap-and-trade

systems could leave open the possibility for polluters to satisfy compliance obligations without
actually reducing their localized facility emissions.

Some cap-and-trade systems have

demonstrated that stringent caps and rule-based ratchets to control banking are successful, and
likewise, some have taken steps toward restricting offsets. 134 While cap-and-trade is designed to
reduce global GHG emissions, it can be fashioned to maximize the localized benefits of copollutant reductions and address environmental justice concerns by maintaining a stringent and
consistently adjusted cap and restricting the use of offsets.
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An overallocation of allowances allows polluters to avoid making dramatic emissions cuts
while still meeting the government’s cap.

This has crystallized in California, where an

overabundance of permits at the beginning of the program has left regulated entities sitting atop
over 100 million banked allowances.135 While CARB has proposed an increasingly stringent cap,
the system will merely act as a “low, steadily rising carbon tax” and companies can easily comply
with banked allowances without actually producing the emissions cuts needed to effect change.136
This conundrum can be easily resolved in a number of ways. As the EU and RGGI have
demonstrated, a rule-based ratchet would reduce caps once the system contains too many banked
allowances, thus restricting the possibility of indefinite allowances for an indefinite period of
time.137 Additionally, regulators can consider setting a lower price limit for allowances sold at an
auction.138 While cap-and-trade is not designed to set specific carbon prices, a hard price floor can
still spur high carbon prices, and the resulting revenue can be invested into environmental justice
communities.139 A successful cap-and-trade system would implement a progressively strict cap
combined with periodic cap adjustments and a minimum auction permit price, accounting for the
changing allowance market, and ensuring that polluters effectively cut their local emissions and
pay for it.
Offsets in cap-and-trade programs have also proven problematic for meeting
environmental justice goals. Offsets are a significant contributor in allowance oversupply issues,
as is demonstrated in California’s system, where the amount of allowances held in private accounts
from 2013–2018 was nearly equal to the amount of CO 2 that the program was expected to
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reduce.140 One study estimated that “if one allowance was removed from the market for every
offset previously used for compliance, California’s current oversupply problem would be nearly
cut in half.”141 Further, offsets are widely criticized for allowing polluters to meet global GHG
compliance obligations without reducing local emissions, leaving communities near their plants to
bear the brunt of threatening co-pollutants. Some groups, like California’s EJAC, have called on
regulators to eliminate offsets entirely and prioritize directly reducing emissions in EJ
communities.142
There is some economic merit for keeping offsets in a cap-and-trade system, as they can
protect the market in the event of a sudden change in allowance prices, but there are feasible ways
to limit their use.143 The government must impose more geographic restrictions on offsets to
ensure that the communities where pollution often occurs do not bear an unequal burden of
harm.144 For instance, the government could require regulated entities to invest in local, impactful
offset projects like “electrification of railyards and ports, cleaning up truck fleets, or financing
retrofits to reduce GHGs and co-pollutant emissions from other local emission sources.” 145 As of
2021, California is already working to geographically restrict offsets, requiring 50% of offset
projects to directly benefit California.146 However, an ideal system would have a more aggressive
in-state or regional offset goal, requiring closer to 100% of a cap-and-trade system’s offset projects
to directly benefit in-state residents. Limiting the use of offsets can generally be beneficial for
technological innovation—if companies could not buy offsets, they would be incentivized to invest
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in more long-term solutions, like upgrading their facilities or investing in renewable energy.147
California is working toward this goal, allowing only up to 4% of a company’s compliance
obligations to be met with offsets from 2021 to 2025, down from 8%. 148 An ideal system would
not only geographically restrict offsets to ensure local benefits, but it would also keep the total of
permissible offsets consistently low and limited, which would encourage substantial facility
emission reductions and spur more innovative solutions.

ii. Investing Auction Proceeds in Environmental Justice Initiatives
Most existing cap-and-trade programs have deliberately dedicated auction revenue to
support disadvantaged communities. However, some EJ advocates take issue with the idea that
the auction revenue depends on pollution that often jeopardizes community health.149 Still, capand-trade mechanisms continue to play a significant role in climate policy across the U.S. and can
be multidimensional, impactful, and politically viable. 150 While seemingly dismaying to the EJ
movement, it is possible to harmonize EJ concerns and successful cap-and-trade mechanisms by
consistently dedicating significant revenue to disadvantaged communities.
While only a recent player in RGGI again, New Jersey has this time around demonstrated
that strategic, intentional planning can include a pathway to reduce emissions, spur economic
growth, and protect disadvantaged communities. 151

The state’s Strategic Funding Plan has

outlined four major initiatives: (1) catalyzing clean, equitable transportation; (2) promoting blue
carbon in coastal habitats; (3) enhancing forests and urban forests; and (4) creating a New Jersey
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Green Bank.152 The initiatives are deliberately designed to give special focus to environmental
justice communities, detailing plans such as prioritizing transportation solutions in overburdened
communities and giving residents in EJ communities primary access to job training in the Green
Bank sector of the economy.153 The Plan intentionally focuses on projects that will benefit
“communities that historically have borne disproportionate burdens of air pollution,” a nod to EJ
values.154 While funding is shared across various government programs, New Jersey’s Strategic
Funding Plan shows that it is possible to incorporate EJ concerns in each and every initiative. An
ideal system must consider the EJ communities’ input when designating auction proceeds and must
deliberately connect initiatives to disadvantaged communities, thus ensuring the most distributive
and efficient impacts.

B. Cap-and-Trade as One Component of Multi-Faceted Climate Legislation
With a global climate crisis on the horizon, much of the scientific consensus is that we need
multi-faceted environmental policies to achieve a dramatic shift to a clean energy economy.155
Cap-and-trade is understandably popular as a mechanism to create economically viable carbon
dioxide reductions, but even the most efficient system would not adequately provide for GHG
reductions and environmental justice concerns.156 In a model climate policy, cap-and-trade would
be just one component of a much more coordinated, effective, and accountable government
mechanism. This comment proposes tackling harmful air pollution on a more granular level
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through both 1) State Implementation Plans through the Clean Air Act and 2) enhanced local air
quality monitoring at a state legislative level.
i.

Federal and State Collaboration through the Clean Air Act
Although companies celebrate cap-and-trade for its flexibility, environmental justice

advocates are wary about whether market forces can do much to include and empower
disadvantaged peoples.157 Moreover, cap-and-trade is specifically designed to address global
GHG concentrations and is not sufficient to address local air quality issues that EJ communities
are primarily concerned with.

Fortunately, the United States has a successful legislative

framework in place with the Clean Air Act. The CAA has already demonstrated great success in
improving American health outcomes158 and has the potential to be a powerful environmental
justice tool, particularly through its State Implementation Plans (SIPs).
In 1970, the CAA was passed with overwhelming bipartisan support, approved unanimously
in the U.S. Senate and with only one dissenting vote in the House of Representatives. 159 Over the
past 50 years, the Act has led to major improvements in American air quality, with one study
estimating that its programs led to a national average annual benefit of $1.1 trillion (adjusted for
inflation) from 1970 to 1990, when considering “avoided human health effects, visibility
improvements, and damage to buildings and crops.”160 The study also found that the energy waste
reduction alone outweighed all of the costs of the CAA, as the economic savings directly benefit
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American taxpayers.161 The Acid Rain Program, which was particularly effective in curbing Acid
Rain, is part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA).
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) retains oversight of the CAA’s
implementation and encourages states to work collaboratively with local, federal, and tribal
governments to combat air pollution and improve health outcomes. 162 The EPA operates with a
unique “cooperative federalism” model, working directly with states to implement environmental
laws, a system that it touts is more effective than “one-size-fits-all mandates.”163 The CAA
requires the EPA to establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) guidelines for
six criteria air pollutants, which are often of concern to the EJ community as they are detrimental
to human health and the environment.164 States can develop their own SIPs that describe how it
will meet the NAAQS.165 The EPA reviews and validates each SIP and retains the authority to
provide guidance or intervene if noncompliance occurs.166 SIPs are designed to monitor air quality
and determine appropriate pollution control strategies, and while they already provide significant
opportunities for community engagement, states can build upon this existing framework and
intentionally integrate EJ values into the development and implementation of their SIPs. 167
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First, it is imperative for state agencies developing a SIP to evaluate social and
environmental disparities and identify which communities are most vulnerable to detrimental air
pollution.168 Once disadvantaged communities are identified, state agencies must continuously
engage with community stakeholders and collect feedback, structure partnerships, and candidly
communicate goals, worries, and limitations.169 Each community may have different concerns—
for example, in areas where the state participates in a cap-and-trade program, residents may be
especially troubled by the potential of hotspots near facilities, out-of-state offsets, or
disproportionate allocation of auction proceeds. 170
By developing meaningful relationships with various stakeholders, such as community
leaders, educators, industry workers, and residents, the state can assess each community’s
individualized needs and determine the most effective pollution control strategies. 171 For instance,
where the negative externalities of cap-and-trade are a priority, the state may structure their SIP to
specifically focus on tracking criteria air pollutant emissions from regulated entities, developing
risk management plans, and ensuring that auction proceeds will be earmarked for EJ communities.
After a SIP is approved by the EPA, states must take care to continue engaging communities and
build on the trusting relationships established during the development phase. 172 A state may
accomplish this by enhancing notice-and-comment procedures for disadvantaged communities to
ensure meaningful citizen involvement.173

Additionally, states may consider sharing simple
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“report cards” and tracking progress surrounding community health, economy, and job creation.174
Not only do these collaborative stakeholder relationships empower EJ communities, but by
memorializing EJ partnerships in a SIP, the state can identify its most pressing climate needs and
encourage federal attention toward the plight of EJ issues.
Clean Air Act State Implementation Plans provide a meaningful avenue for EJ
communities to have a voice in improving local air quality and create beneficial, symbiotic
relationships with the state (and by extension, federal) government. For now, SIPs appear to be
one of the most important existing opportunities for EJ communities to have a say in federal policy,
as political divisions have made the potential of new federal climate legislation extremely difficult,
if not impossible.175 Independent of the power that the CAA and the EPA vest in states to improve
air quality in EJ communities, states must also look to implementing local legislation, using
California as a guidepost.
ii. State Legislation to Improve Air Quality
In California, EJ advocates have made their opposition to the state’s cap-and-trade program
abundantly clear, arguing that the system fails to guarantee local air quality improvements. 176 AB32 was designed to direct unprecedented attention toward EJ causes, but in practice, the bill
overpromised with its broad goals to tackle local pollution and global GHGs in one legislative
stroke.177 When it came time to renew California’s cap-and-trade bill in 2017, the state attempted
to assuage some EJ concerns with a companion bill, Assembly Bill 617. 178 AB 617 was designed
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to directly address local air pollution while carefully integrating community engagement
procedures and placing emphasis on EJ communities’ input in the development and
implementation of community-level emission reduction plans.179
AB 617 created a new regulatory authority and designated funding toward enhanced local
air pollution monitoring systems, with a goal to better diagnose specific pollution hotspots. 180 In
its first phase, the California Air Resources Board selected 10 regional communities to participate
and created “community steering committees,” or CSCs, composed of various community
stakeholders to identify the residents’ needs and concerns. 181 The CSCs then create community
air monitoring plans to gather data about local air quality issues, which help to inform
comprehensive emission reductions plans.182 Aggressive air quality monitoring can shed light on
how harmful emissions give rise to issues like odor, noise, respiratory diseases, and smog.183
Steering committees have wide discretion to determine how to best tackle the air pollution
affecting their communities, and CARB must ultimately approve each plan and can provide more
specific guidance on local emissions reduction strategies.184 While the program is still early in its
implementation phase and its success remains to be seen, it is unique in its collaborative nature
and hyper-local focus.185
To address local air quality concerns, states can learn from California and earmark funding
toward enhanced air quality monitoring systems and community engagement procedures. With
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more comprehensive and nuanced air quality information, communities are empowered to
understand the problems facing their communities, decide how to prioritize immediate action, and
advocate for long-term solutions.186 Environmentally disadvantaged communities are not unique
to California, and California’s AB 617 can serve as a blueprint for other states and regions. AB
617 also serves as an important reminder (in large part due to tireless EJ advocacy) that the greater
beast of global climate change cannot be solved with the same policy tools that tackle local air
pollution. Legislators must recognize that in order to empower marginalized communities and
further the cause of environmental, racial, and social justice, we need to identify and integrate
more collaborative, meaningful, and localized air quality solutions.

V: CONCLUSION
Cap-and-trade systems are appealing to economists, politicians, and environmentalists
alike.

Emissions trading systems allow companies to comply with pollution caps in an

individualized, economic manner, and can be highly effective in reducing atmospheric GHGs, a
key contributor to climate change. The U.S. Acid Rain Program demonstrates how cap-and-trade
mechanisms can be successfully employed to curb harmful emissions, and California and the
RGGI states have shown how EJ concerns may be incorporated into their policies. However, there
is still much work to be done to achieve a clean energy economy that addresses deleterious copollutants and delivers the most impactful, effective solutions to EJ communities.

The EJ

movement has fought tirelessly against industry forces and EJ communities have traditionally dealt
with the brunt of air pollution. Advocates continue to voice legitimate concerns that companies
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are still able to continue polluting under cap-and-trade and disproportionately burden their
communities.
Cap-and-trade systems in their current form are not designed to properly accommodate EJ
concerns nor protect disadvantaged communities. However, cap-and-trade programs can reform
banking and offsetting practices to ensure real, substantial emissions reductions. States must use
existing regulatory authority in their SIPs to integrate EJ concerns and must also impose more
governmental regulations to ensure greater accountability, oversight, and public participation.
Through careful, cooperative, and multifaceted strategy, we can achieve climate policy that not
only addresses the most devastating effects of climate change but also supports and advances
environmental justice causes.187
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